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Abstract—Denial of service (DOS) attacks pose a 
tremendous risk to organizations. The attacks have 
shifted from attacks at the layer 3 and layer 4 (network 
level) to layer 7 attacks, which are not quickly detectable 
by firewalls and utmost Intrusion Detection systems. An 
accelerating number of those attacks against the 
infrastructures of web servers of numerous organizations 
has been reported. The research aims to investigate some 
layer 7 application DOS attack tools and test open-source 
tools that offer some defense against these attacks. The 
research used open-source load balancing software, 
namely HAProxy as the front line of defense against DOS 
attacks to assess the effectiveness in detecting and 
preventing layer 7 DoS attacks. We demonstrate how a 
properly configured HAProxy can handle a variety of 
DOS attacks in a much more efficient manner. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Denial of service attacks is a major threat to online 
business infrastructures. The attack intended to shut down the 
machine or cut off network connection. Symantec recorded a 
vast number of online business attacks [1]. The attacks move 
from the network layer, which requires massive resources and 
great bandwidth to perform. An attacker operating from a 
single appliance will submit massive traffic to overwhelm a 
web server which makes the system inaccessible for other 
authentic users. Most businesses have primarily relied on e-
commerce for the majority of their revenue and service 
provision. The attacks continue to be a major threat to the 
network of online business.   
Some companies rely on social media sites for advertising 
and direct customer contact. A reduction of quality of the 
service will cost money to some businesses [3]. The danger 
of DoS attacks on online companies is rising equally. In 2016, 
the largest DOS attack scale ever reported, was performed on 
DNS provider, Dyn, utilizing botnets infected with Mirai's 
Internet of Things (IoT). The attack hit major websites 
including PayPal, Facebook and Netflix. Sometimes, such 
attacks are utilized as distracting tactics to distract 
concentration from other cyber-attacks, which contribute to 
the data-stealing. Verisign reported a 75 % increase in the 
pattern of Layer 7 DOS attacks across all verticals of business 
[4].  Given the growing prevalence of the attacks, the work 
seeks to use open source software as well as tries to explore 
how resources can support to detect and deter a DoS attack as 
well as allowing post-event threat analysis. An HAProxy is 
an open-source platform for load balancing and defense 
mechanisms against DOS attack from Layer 7. Two attacks, 
namely the HTTP GET and HTTP POST are common as they 
manipulate a function of the HTTP protocol that leave the 
connection open while waiting for the web server receives the 
legitimate HTTP full request [5]. 
Attackers take advantage of such a vulnerability to block 
system resources that other legitimate web application 
consumers are denied access to the client because threads, full 
link sockets, and other device resources are left open to 
unscrupulous attackers. The researchers are trying to see 
whether HAProxy can be used to protect against a DOS attack 
and discuss the potential of the open-source platform, ELK 
Stack, in providing real-time data log reviews as well as 
warning approaches when a server is going down or when an 
attack is going on by monitoring device and logging 
information in near real-time.  
Denial of service attacks (DOS) is where infrastructure 
and services for legitimate users are rendered. The DDOS 
(Distributed Denial of Service) attack is an enhanced variant 
of DOS, where several infected devices are hired for the 
attack [6]. The DDOS is a sophisticated type of DOS, where 
bots comprising corrupted networks or computers, are 
involved instead of a person or a specific device perpetrating 
the attack.  These bots or Botnets are set up by leveraging the 
inherent weaknesses of computer systems and operating such 
systems in a coordinated broad-scale attack on target systems 
[7]. These attacks have potential consequences such as 
service interruption, network unavailability, and may result 
in data failure being triggered to user device resources 
[8]. Distributed DOS attacks have lately become one of the 
biggest threats to the stability and security of the networks 
and web services [9]. These attacks involve the attacker's 
immense bandwidth and resource that is challenging to 
arrange, excepting the case of an individual's HTTP flood 
attack or using a tiny botnet [10]. Another approach would be 
to identify the attacks based on the targeting of the network 
layer, primarily the Network/Transport layers as well as the 
application layers.  The classification of the attacks can be 
based on the attack's resource target, primarily Bandwidth 
Usage and Use of Server Resources [11]. One means of 
categorizing DOS attacks is through the mode of attack either 
reflector/amplification attack or direct attack [12]. 
The seventh layer of the OSI model is the application 
layer. It concerns how the user primarily communicates with 
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the HTTP(S), SMTP, FTP, a protocol stack, etc. [13]. 
Because of the existence of the layer that allows direct user 
interaction, attackers can bring down a website by sending 
repeated queries, continual reloading and demanding details 
from the database that may or may not exist. DOS attacks 
against web applications have been becoming more common 
with layer 7 GETs and POST attacks amongst the latest 
techniques of DOS attacks [8] claiming to be very 
complicated methods for DOS attacks at the application 
layer. Standard DOS identification and prevention methods 
are ineffective for these Layer 7 attacks [12] as in application 
layer DOS attacks. Compromised devices submit high 
volume pernicious database service requests via regular TCP 
connections to the target web servers [9]. The attacker aims 
to constantly requesting a heavy URL from the victim in 
order to drain the target's computing resources. This layer 
attacks are typically more complex and have more damage on 
the victim's computing capital while costing very little 
money to the attacker to perpetrate the attack [14].  
The HTTP Post attack is powerful and effective, 
occurring when an intruder infiltrates the webserver with 
gradually abounding data inside the request body of the 
HTTP Post. Because it is an HTTP protocol-compliant 
request, it has to keep the connection open while the attacker 
drains the resources, leaving the web application unavailable 
to legitimate site users [14], [8]. The attacker sends the 
request header rapidly and defines the size of the message 
body that the web application will anticipate. The intruder 
subsequently sends the full HTTP header info allowing the 
contact appears quite valid but later sends the message body 
thousands of already established connections at a rate of one 
byte per 100 seconds. The intruder makes the request-transfer 
rate incredibly slow, and this hogs the web-server's memory 
power and CPU, irrespective of the hardware capacity of the 
web-servers, as it awaits complete data transmission before 
the link is closed [15]. HTTP GET queries occur when a user 
enters a URL in the web-browser's address bar and clicks the 
enter button or when a web-application user seeks hyperlinks 
in a web application.  
The HTTP Get attack imitates the behavior of 
website's genuine users, but the intruder sends an abundant 
HTTP Get requests by means of botnets or other methods to 
make the application inaccessible to legitimate users. Such 
requests are usually identical with the standard 
HTTP request-bar. It is difficult to distinguish such attacks 
because the requests are typically sent through valid network 
packages, standard TCP link, and request the web legitimate 
content [16]. Popular defense mechanisms detecting and 
filtering DOS traffic on the basis of the illegitimacy of the 
request and the request rate are ineffective in mitigating this 
form of attack [17], [18]. This is because "the traffic to the 
attacker is as legitimate as the traffic to normal users"[19]. A 
sample of such attacks is HTTP GET slow read request 
attack, commonly referred to as the Slow READ attack. The 
attacker continually hits the web servers with requests, which 
leaves the connection open, resulting in the waste resources-
memory of the client, CPU time [10]. 
Prevalent load balancers like F5 and Cisco may be 
utilized to protect against HTTP GET DOS attacks [20], [21]. 
A load balancer accommodating a large number of requests 
and communications from a large number of users and 
devices is important [22]. HAProxy standing for the High 
Availability Proxy is a prevalent HTTP load balancer and 
open source TCP [23]. It provides several solutions for load 
balancing algorithms and conducts back-end server health 
checks before it routes traffic to only stable nodes [23]. 
ackend server status and incoming and outgoing traffic detai
ls may be evaluated using the Details method (Figure 1). 
HAProxy creates logs that can help uncover which program 
causes a problem in one event. It may operate in TCP mode, 
testing whether databases such as MySQL server are 
running and in HTTP mode. 
  
Fig. 1. Frontend and Backend layers of HAProxy 
The backend of the HAProxy consists of one or several 
servers, to which requests submitted are delivered. Backend 
setup consists primarily of web servers, HAProxy ports for 
listening, a health check system, a load balancing algorithm, 
and several other specialized configurations. The frontend 
specifies the front end's port number and IP address, some 
ACLs and other specialized settings.  
High Availability is the capacity of a program striving to 
achieve a more advanced output including uptime. Such 
function uses an active failover program which cuts 
downtime for a business [24]. A high-availability system 
ensures that errors are found when arising and measures are 
set to minimize those errors, and confirms that there is no 
single point failure in the entire system so that the user never 
suffers down-times. There are various formulas that calculate 
the amount of downtime and each company determines what 
degree of downtime is appropriate on the basis of service 
level agreements (SLAs). Most systems have security 
susceptibilities that hackers may leverage to trigger denial of 
service functionality for legitimate device customers, and 
sometimes result in server downtime. In a production 
environment, a simple advantage of HAProxy provides users 
with a high availability when correctly installed, and backend 
nodes are allowed to be withdrawn or introduced to the 
HAProxy with no down-time [23]. Failover is the system's 
ability to stay working while one or more of its elements are 
down. 
 HAProxy gives the capability to designate web servers as 
backups, and when main web-servers go down, the backups 
are restored into an active pool. By announcing the option "all 
backup in configuration file". The backup server farms may 
be linked to the active HAProxy pool [25]. This server is 
designed to be failover farm when all servers are down. When 
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all active and backup services are inaccessible, it is important 
to use a personalized error page to inform consumers on 
efforts to restore service [26]. HAProxy facilitates load 
balancing algorithms like Round Robin, and more 
complicated algorithms like Least Link Origin, IP Hash, URL 
Hash, and Weighted-RR.     
ELK Stack is a grouping of three open-source resources, 
namely Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana. Elasticsearch is 
Apache Lucene project-based text indexing and search 
engine application for profound searches, queries, and data 
analysis [27], [28]. Kibana is the ELK Stack's visualization 
portion. It offers graphical displays of data retrieved from 
the Elasticsearch and offers the ability to easily view vital 
info probably mix up with big data.  
II. EVALUATION  
The attacker connects to the HAProxy server’s IP address 
through the' internet'. The HAProxy server collects traffic via 
its frontend and afterwards allocates the traffic to the web 
server’s backend. The logs stored on the HAProxy server is 
sent by means of Beats log shipping tools, namely Metricbeat 
and Filebeat to ELK server. Figure 2 illustrates the system 
architecture. 
   
Fig. 2. System architecture 
HAProxy is installed on a server that handles data from 
web users and loads the data as a first line of defense against 
DOS attack in order that unexpected large surges in HTTP 
traffic flows do not overload the backend servers. The 
HAProxy server consists of a frontend in which all access to 
the backend servers is reached first, and the backend 
HAProxy service is connected to the backend web servers 
later. A load balancing helps remove single point of failure in 
a system to help recognize errors and differentiate 
malfunction component faults. The HAproxy load balancer 
allocates the traffic to the backend servers according to the 
designed load balancing formula, and it eliminates the simple 
bottlenecks in the HTTP traffic. To assist with replication, 
HAProxy enables server setup as an active-backup (failover) 
in the case of one or more of the main servers crashing. The 
configuration is designed where the administrator considers 
it crucial to put a another server into the load-balanced servers 
active pool to deliver another layer of DoS attack protection 
once the main servers have been marked down. The 
Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana, installed on the ELK 
server are utilized for distributed storage, data processing, log 
review, as well as log virtualization. To create DOS attack, 
GoldenEye DoS attack tool is used, and the attack traffic is 
forwarded from the HAProxy server to the ELK server for 
review. The HAProxy statistics page gathers and analyzes the 
event logs created throughout the DOS attack to identify 
patterns that can be used when the alarm is activated when 
such an event takes place. The HAproxy service collects data, 
utilizing the required load balancing algorithm to disperse the 
traffic to backend servers. 
To evaluate the effects of the DOS attack and build a test 
for evaluating the efficacy of the load balancer and its 
security measures, the DOS attack was experimented on two 
web servers operating the Apache to see whether the result is 
equivalent on both. Similar experiments were performed on 
the server operating a standard setup to monitor the results of 
the attack without having to implement extra security 
mechanism to help mitigate the DOS threat. Lastly, 
the HAProxy server is safe for DOS, and the same 
experiment is undertaken to seeing the efficacy of DOS 
security settings to prevent DOS attacks. Using the 
GoldenEye DOS attack method, HTTP traffic was sent to 
web servers through the server’s IP address to generate 
adequate traffic to analyze the log. 
SlowHTTPTest was used to test a Denial of Service 
Attack at Layer 7 implemented on the Slowloris attack, Slow 
POST attack, Slow READ attack, and Apache Range Header 
attack. The attack length was 240 seconds by default, and the 
connections listed is 1000 with 200 connections per-second 
for all the tests. It used default content header length of 4096. 
The timeout probe was 3 seconds with a 10-second period 
between launch of the attacks. The attack tool determined the 
follow-up data size for the HTTP POST attack, slow BODY 
attack, and the Extra data max length in the case of Slow 
HTTP headers attack based on the default configuration.   
Experiment 1: Attack directly on Web server using 
slowhttptest 
Experiment 1 aimed to determine what effect it would 
have to submit massive number of queries directly to a web 
server without using a load balancer and to evaluate if the 
balancer offers some level of security toward the DoS attack 
relative to the launching of the attack. The experiments 
conducted on both web servers without using a load balancer 
displayed comparable results. The web servers did not 
recover from the Slowloris attack until the maximum attack 
time limit 240 seconds. 
 
Fig. 3. Graph showing the status of the connection 
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Fig. 4. Graph slowing the READ attack directly on the web server 
We performed a slow BODY/slow POST attack against 
the web servers using a fake HTTP request term, 
CHECKVERB, and parameter to the targeted web server, 
VM1 while also encountering the attack on the web servers. 
The attack sent a 10000 content-length values but sent out 22 
per 110 seconds. It made busy web server resources. After the 
5th second, the webserver was unable to provide any service, 
and the system finally crashed at the 110th second, finish the 
attack with Connection's exit status-declined (see Figure 3). 
The final experiment was the sluggish READ attack aimed at 
the webserver.  The attack enabled 1000 valid HTTP requests 
per second and a 10 to 20-second receive window range. It 
read the response at around 6 to 7 bytes per second.  
Figure 4 displays the specifics of the test parameters 
applied during the attack and shows the status 
representation of the 1000 connections over the course of the 
attack. The web server attached for 223 requests but kept 
pending the remining 777 requests. Service became 
inaccessible at the 10th second and during the subsequent 230 
seconds, 270 connections were enabled. A total of 730 
connections were closed at the 240th second. The service 
became inaccessible during the 10th second and the 
remaining seconds of the attack.  
Experiment 2: Attack on Web Servers via Basic 
HAProxy Server 
Experiment 2 was carried out using load balancer but 
rendered without any DOS protection configuration settings. 
The first test applied on the unsecured HAProxy server was 
the Slow Header/Slowloris attack. The same research criteria 
were used in the study. The HAProxy server recorded time-
length of the attack, 240 seconds. Figure 5 displays the 
parameters and the graphical depiction of the attack over the 
entire time of the experiment. To obtain a benchmark to 
evaluate the efficacy of the HAProxy's security settings in 
preventing the Slowloris attack, the number of the 
connections was increased to perceive its impact on the 
HAProxy server.  The service identified by HAProxy attack 
stopped working at the 10th second but recovered att the 15th 
second. After the attack stopped, 1664 connections had been 
successful while 336 connections were closed. Figure 6 
shows the connection status till the time limit of the attack. 
 
Fig. 5. Graph displaying the connections for the slow header attack on the 
HAProxy server 
 
Fig. 6. Graph displaying the result of 240s of Slowloris attack on the 
unsecured HAProxy 
A fake Body/Slow POST attack was performed using a 
fake HTTP verb (CHECKVERB). The service became 
inaccessible at the 10th second but recovered at the 55th 
second. Nonetheless, the server was unable to take any new 
connections at 70th second. The load balancer recorded a 
status of No Open Connection Left though the available 
service and no web servers crashed due to the overload. 
Graphical illustration of the connection status through the 
course of the attack was displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Fig. 7. Graph displaying Slow body attack on the unsecured HAProxy 
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Fig. 8. Graph of the service availability for the duration of the attack 
The final test on the unsecured HAProxy server is the 
slow READ attack. The number of receiving windows in the 
attack was 10 -20, and the read rate was 6 to 7 bytes per 
second. After 5 seconds of testing, if the server is active, the 
attack device re-coordinates and relaunches the attack. The 
HAProxy recorded service inaccessible at the 10th second but 
retrieved at the 30th second. Nevertheless, the retrieval did 
not last because the service fluctuated several times within 
the first 80 seconds. However, it was restored at the rest of 
attack time-duration. 
To restore the service, the system was rebooted.   
The HAProxy with the basic configuration showed high 
flexibility during the Slowloris attack relative to slow POST 
and slow READ attack. Service availability of the Slowloris 
attack was 100% when 1000 connections were used per 
second, but when the connection rate per second was 
doubled, 17% of the connections were decreased. 
Nevertheless, for 95% of the attack time-period, the service 
was constant.  With the default setup, the HAProxy server 
was unable to provide service for about 35% of the attack 
time-period. Approximately 830 connections were retained 
while the remaining 170 connections were discarded. The 
worst result was for the slow POST attack. The service was 
inaccessible for 45 seconds out of the 70 seconds. Yet, all 
accessible connections were depleted at the 70th second. 
The result of the experiment found that web servers could 
only sustain the service for less than a fixed time of 10 
seconds when directly attacked. A server crash was reported 
while the launch of attack on the web server. The HAProxy 
showed better handling for the Slowloris attack compared to 
the other attacks. 
Experiment 3: Attack on Web Servers Via Secure 
HAProxy Server 
The HTTP-request timeout was set for five seconds to a 
suitable number to avoid the Slowloris attack. After applying 
the security settings to the HAProxy config file, we carried 
out the Slowloris attack. The corresponding Attack Order was 
released on the secured HAProxy server. The attack persisted 
within 10 seconds. The test finished on 11th second with a 
status of no open connection remaining, but the service was 
reported available. The warning of no available connections 
remaining was validated to apply only to the attacker's 
connections. Separate connections made from another device 
suggested that connections and the service were still 
accessible. Figure 9 displays that all connections after five 
seconds were closed because the config file was set up with 
a connection timeout of five-second if a full request is not 
received. 
 
Fig. 9. Graph shows that all connections after 5 seconds were closed  
Later, we carried out a Slow BODY attack and Slow 
READ attack, launched on the secure HAProxy server. The 
Slow BODY attack lasted for about 10 seconds. The server 
recorded no open connections remaining at the 10th second 
of attack. The service was only inaccessible to the attacker 
but still accessible for all other users. The Slow READ attack 
sent a 10 to 20 receive window but read at the rate of 6 to 7 
bytes per second. The attack continued for 240 seconds, and 
the service was inaccessible for merely five seconds. The 
HAProxy server closed 980 connections requests on average 
and connected 20. During the attack, the connection cut after 
the 35th second but recovered at the 40th second. It was 
similar to the previous attack.  The secure HAProxy server 
was capable of handling the Slowloris attack. The attacker's 
connections were effectively restricted to the limits 
configured in the configuration file. All connections to the 
ongoing attack were closed.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
This paper delved into layer 7 attacks with a focus on 
slow BODY, slow POST, and slow READ attack techniques. 
When a web application traffic is directly redirected to a web 
server, it exposes a single point of web infrastructure's failure 
and is not a sensible method given the current patterns, in 
which daily continuous traffic to the web applications has 
become so critical. The reasoning behind all these methods is 
the use of modules integrating dynamic-scheduling 
mechanism to dynamically assign backend servers to 
handle incoming requests in the list of queues with various 
priority levels. This method proved ideal both for load 
balancing and for avoiding DOS attacks. Such a method has 
proven to be proper for load balancing as well as for 
preventing DOS attacks.  
The improvement of the HAProxy's security has created 
a significant performance enhancement. Connection to a web 
application is denied to an attacker based on the traffic 
patterns which he presents. A usual web application user does 
not open 2000 connections in a second and 200 simultaneous 
connections. HAProxy senses this feature, and then prevents 
the attacker. The implementation of the time-out of an HTTP 
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request and putting buffer size's limitation stops the slow 
POST attack from consuming backend web server resources.  
It is reasonable to configuring a free open source and a 
lightweight load balancing algorithm to improve 
performance, high availability, and simultaneously function 
as the first powerful layer of protection against the DOS 
attack.  Ultimately, using preference manager modules along 
with several buffer queues with different priorities may assist 
filtering and sorting incoming requests. according to different 
priority levels depending on the authenticity of the 
request's sources or the irregular existence of the request 
traffic. 
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